Envelope
A versioned, canonical envelope
The document is encoded with a single canonical rule so it hashes identically in every implementation — key order sorted, numbers as integers or decimal strings, no floats. Hash verification is meaningless if two verifiers serialize differently.
Canonical encoding is the precondition for every other guarantee on this page.
Auditing
Monotonic version
Versions increment by exactly one. The chain is append-only, so history cannot be silently rewritten — every prior state remains reachable and hashable.
Identity · TAP-1
The agent is a tz4 account
A PRAXIS agent identity must be a Tezos tz4 (BLS12-381) account. The BLS scheme lets principal, agent, and witness signatures aggregate into one verifiable artifact rather than three separate checks.
tz4 is reserved for the agent. It is never the controller.
Accountability
The accountable principal
Control is vested in the controller recorded in the anchor — a legally answerable tz1 principal or wallet — not in whoever holds the token. Changing it is a deliberate two-step handoff, never a silent transfer.
Discovery, not grant
What it may attempt
Dotted namespaces register what the agent is permitted to try — a discovery surface for counterparties. They are never a grant of authority. Actual authority is the live CPoA.
Non-repudiation
A depth-0 accountable root
The delegation chain must terminate in a depth-0 root principal. The anti-“unaccountable void” rule is enforced by validateAid — an identity that cannot name a legally answerable principal is rejected at construction.
Attribution becomes a property of construction, not forensic reconstruction.
Authority · TAP-3
CPoA anchors
The live, scoped, revocable mandate the agent acts under, referenced by hash. Discovery proposes an authority chain; the CPoA record confirms it is active, in-scope, and unexpired at the moment of action.
Immutable root
The genesis hash
Derived once at genesis and carried unchanged through every later version. It is the immutable identity root — its constancy is checked on every chain walk, so an identity cannot be quietly re-based.
Tamper-evidence
The backward link
Each version commits to its predecessor by content hash. The chain is verified link by link back to genesis; a broken or forged link fails closed.
NIST SP 800-63
Assurance floors
Declared IAL / AAL / FAL levels and key custody, drawn from the NIST vocabulary, let a relying party require a floor before trusting. A one-byte downgrade is caught by re-projection.
Lifecycle
Point-in-time status
Active, superseded, or revoked — evaluated at an explicit instant with no hidden clock. Revocation is terminal; an offboarded identity can never read as active.
Fields enforce rules. Removing one removes a guarantee.